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C. S. LEWIS'S CRITIQUE OF 
HUME'S "OF MIRACLES"
Robert A. Larmer
In this article I argue that C. S. Lewis is both a perceptive reader and trenchant 
critic of David Hume's views on miracle.
Despite his popularity as a Christian apologist and despite the fact that one 
of his major works is Miracles: A Preliminary Study, C. S. Lewis is virtually 
ignored in contemporary discussions of miracles. When he is mentioned, 
he is usually quickly dismissed as displaying a superficial understanding 
of David Hume's famous criticism of the possibility of rational belief in 
miracles based on testimonial evidence.
My contention in this article is that such dismissals are unjustified. Al­
though he did not write as a professional philosopher and did not direct 
his writing to specialists in philosophy, Lewis was well trained in philoso­
phy. While a student at University College, Oxford, he received a First in 
Greats (Philosophy and Ancient History) and, as a young man, served 
as philosophy tutor at University College. While at Oxford, Lewis served 
as the first president of the famous Socratic Club founded by Stella Ald- 
winckle in 1941 as an "open forum for the discussion of the intellectual 
difficulties connected with religion and with Christianity in particular."1 
Regarding the Socratic Club, Antony Flew has commented that "the five 
or ten years immediately following the end of World War II were the hey­
day of what the media dubbed 'Oxford linguistic philosophy' . . . [and] it 
was mainly in meetings of the Socratic Club that Oxford linguistic philos­
ophers . . . began to explore what Immanuel Kant famously distinguished 
as the three great questions of philosophy—God, Freedom and Immor­
tality."2 Lewis regularly read papers at the Scoratic Club and engaged in 
dialogue with Elizabeth Anscombe, A. J. Ayer, Antony Flew and Gilbert 
Ryle, to name only a few of the philosophers that contributed papers. The 
fact that philosophers of this stature took Lewis seriously suggests that 
his critique of Hume's "Of Miracles" deserves more attention by profes­
sional philosophers than it typically receives. Once this attention is paid 
it becomes clear that, although he did not devote a great deal of space to 
discussion of Hume's argument, Lewis is both a perceptive reader and 
trenchant critic of Hume's views on miracle.
Three major criticisms of Hume's position emerge in Miracles. The 
first two occur in Chapter XIII, "On Probability," and are explicitly de­
veloped in response to Hume. The third occurs in Chapter VIII, "Miracle 
and the Laws of Nature," and is not explicitly developed in response to
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Hume, although it seems to contain Lewis's most important objection to 
Hume's argument.
Lewis's explicit criticisms of Hume focus on the argument of Part I of 
the "Essay on Miracles." He raises the issues of: (1) whether Hume's ac­
count of natural law found in "Of Miracles" is consistent with what he says 
elsewhere concerning causality and induction, and (2) whether Hume's 
argument against the rationality of belief in miracles is viciously circular. 
It is interesting that, although these two criticisms can be distinguished, 
they are curiously intertwined in Lewis's exposition. I think the reason 
this is so is that Lewis is concerned not only to expose flaws in Hume's ar­
gument, but to provide positive philosophical grounds for taking reports 
of miracles seriously.
Lewis's interpretation of the argument of Part I of the "Essay" is the tra­
ditional one that it is intended to demonstrate that belief in a miracle can 
never, even in principle, be rationally justified on the basis of testimonial 
evidence.3 He summarizes the argument as follows:
Probability rests on what may be called the majority vote of our past 
experiences. The more often a thing has been known to happen, the 
more probable it is that it should happen again; and the less often the 
less probable. . . . The regularity of Nature's course . . . is supported 
by something better than the majority vote of past experiences: it is 
supported by their unanimous vote, . . . by "firm and unalterable 
experience." There is, . . . "uniform experience" against Miracle; oth­
erwise, . . . it would not be a Miracle. A miracle is therefore the most 
improbable of all events. It is always more probable that the wit­
nesses were lying or mistaken than that a miracle occurred.4
In response to Hume, Lewis initially raises the issue of whether the 
argument is circular, but then digresses to the question of how belief in 
the uniformity of nature is justified, only to return after this digression 
to the charge that Hume's argument is circular. It is in the context of 
this digression that Lewis develops, very briefly, an ad hominem argu­
ment that Hume's assumption of the uniformity of nature in the "Es­
say" is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere regarding induction. 
Lewis writes,
Unless Nature always goes on in the same way, the fact that a thing 
had happened ten million times would not make it a whit more 
probable that it would happen again. And how do we know the Uni­
formity of Nature? A moment's thought shows that we do not know 
it by experience. . . . Experience . . . cannot prove uniformity, because 
uniformity has to be assumed before experience proves anything. . . . 
Unless Nature is uniform, nothing is either probable or improbable. 
And clearly the assumption which you have to make before there 
is any such thing as probability cannot itself be probable. . . . The 
odd thing is that no man knew this better than Hume. His Essay on 
Miracles is quite inconsistent with the more radical, and honourable, 
scepticism of his main work.5
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This criticism is hardly unique to Lewis. There is no way of knowing for 
sure, but Lewis may well have been aware that C. D. Broad had made this 
point at much greater length in an article published in the 1916-17 volume 
of the Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society. Broad writes:
Hume has told us that he can find no logical ground for induction. 
He cannot see why it should be justifiable to pass from a frequent 
experience of A followed by B, to a belief that A always will be fol­
lowed by B. All that he professes to do is to tell us that we actually 
do make this transition, and to explain psychologically how it comes 
about. Now, this being so, I cannot see how Hume can distinguish 
between our variously caused beliefs about matters of fact, and call 
some of them justifiable and others unjustifiable. . . . Hume's disbe­
lief [in a miracle] is due to his natural tendency to pass from the con­
stant experience of A followed by B to the belief that A will always be 
followed by B. The enthusiast's belief is due to his natural tendency 
to believe what is wonderful and makes for the credit of his religion. 
But Hume has admitted that he sees no logical justification for beliefs 
in matters of fact which are merely caused by a regular experience. 
Hence the enthusiast's belief in miracles and Hume's belief in natu­
ral laws (and consequent disbelief in miracles) stand on precisely 
the same logical footing. In both cases we can see the psychologi­
cal cause of the belief, but in neither can Hume give us any logical 
ground for it.6
Fred Wilson suggests that Broad's and, by implication Lewis's, reading of 
Hume on this point is superficial. In response to Broad and Lewis's claim 
that Hume's treatment of miracles is not consistent with his views regard­
ing induction, Wilson writes that "there is a certain implausibility to this 
claim that makes it a difficult one to entertain seriously, since it is unlikely 
that a philosopher as careful as Hume would have failed to recognize the 
inconsistency if it existed."7 It may be agreed that it is unwise to be over­
hasty in attributing inconsistency to a philosopher of Hume's stature, but 
it is scarcely unknown that the greatest thinkers are occasionally guilty in 
this regard, and there seems no reason to assume that Hume is incapable 
of such slips. The real question is whether the text supports Wilson's inter­
pretation, as opposed to Broad and Lewis's.
Wilson offers two arguments in support of his contention that Hume 
is not guilty of inconsistency. The first is that neither the scepticism inher­
ent in Hume's treatment of causality and induction nor the dogmatism 
characteristic of his explicit statements in "Of Miracles" represents his 
true view concerning the laws of nature. Wilson suggests that in order 
to arrive at Hume's true view of the laws of nature, we must examine his 
account of probable reasoning and its grounding in human psychology. 
When we do this we find that the idea of necessary connection is retained 
as an essential element of the concept of causality, but that this idea of 
necessary connection is grounded in human psychology, not in nature it- 
self.8 The justification of taking our admittedly psychologically grounded 
concept of causality as involving necessary connections seriously is that 
it offers a pragmatic justification of science and it is science alone that is
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capable of satisfying our curiosity and desire for truth.9 Belief in miracles 
explains nothing and leaves our experience incomprehensible, whereas 
belief in causality and the uniformity of nature allows us to understand 
the world.
Wilson's second argument is that Hume's account of causal reasoning 
is not simply that in our experience an event A is always followed by an 
event B.10 Hume recognized that in our experience "'tis frequently found, 
that one observation is contrary to another, and that causes and effects 
follow not in the same order of which we have had experience, [in such 
instances] we are oblig'd to vary our reasoning on account of this uncer­
tainty, and take into consideration the contrariety of events."11 Thus, "from 
the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim, 
that the connexion betwixt all causes and effects is equally necessary, and 
that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret 
opposition of contrary causes."12 Wilson concludes from remarks such as 
this that "Hume's crucial move is to insist that simply because an event 
is somehow incomprehensible to a spectator, it does not follow that one 
can reasonably infer that it is a miracle, or even probably a miracle."13 He 
goes on to chastise Broad, and by implication Lewis, for failing to recog­
nize that "the fact that we discover exceptions to what we have previously 
thought to be regularities hardly testifies to there being events that are 
miracles, that is, events that violate laws of nature."14
With regard to Wilson's first argument, two critical comments seem in 
order. First, Hume's most explicit remarks concerning the laws of nature 
occur in "Of Miracles." It is exegetically suspect to ignore his explicit treat­
ment of the laws of nature in the "Essay" in hopes of deriving a more 
palatable alternative from a different portion of his philosophy. Further, 
deriving a more palatable alternative would not absolve Hume of the 
charge of inconsistency, since it would remain true that it is not the con­
cept of unalterable natural law he is working with in "Of Miracles." The 
issue is not whether Hume could have developed a concept of the laws of 
nature consistent with his treatment of induction and causality or whether 
such a concept can be found elsewhere in his work but whether the con­
cept actually employed in "Of Miracles" is consistent with his treatment 
of induction and causality earlier in the Enquiry.15
Second, the suggestion that belief in the uniformity of nature can be 
pragmatically justified on the basis of the success of science16 begs the ques­
tion of whether Hume's treatment of induction is consistent with the view 
of science being espoused by Wilson. Wilson seems to feel that any diffi­
culty in this regard can be overcome if we realize that "the fact that we run 
across an event that violates a regular pattern of our experience provides 
evidence only that the pattern is not a law, but it does not falsify the belief 
that there is a law that explains it, for the latter can be inferred on the basis 
of our more general experience, which leads us to conclude that for any 
event there is a law that explains it."17 What Wilson fails to see is that any 
appeal to experience as justifying the conclusion that for every event there 
is a law that explains it is inconsistent with Hume's account of induction. 
We have already noted Lewis's comment that "experience . . . cannot prove 
uniformity, because uniformity has to be assumed before experience proves 
anything."18 Once one accepts Hume's denial of necessary connections and
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his reduction of causality to constant conjunction, it becomes impossible 
to argue that the fact that certain events have been constantly conjoined in 
the past provides any reason for thinking they will be constantly, or even 
probably, conjoined in the future.19 As Hume comments, "it is impossible 
. . . that any arguments from experience can prove . . . resemblance of the 
past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition 
of that resemblance .20 Wilson's appeal to the rules of eliminative induction 
as grounding science presupposes that we can justify prediction of the fu­
ture on the basis of past experience and involves a view of induction that 
contradicts Hume's explicit treatment of this issue.21
Wilson's second argument "that Hume's crucial move is to insist that 
simply because an event is somehow incomprehensible to a spectator, it 
does not follow that one can reasonably infer that it is a miracle, or even 
probably a miracle"22 and thus "the fact that we discover exceptions to 
what we have previously thought to be regularities hardly testifies to 
there being events that are miracles, that is, events that violate laws of 
nature"23 also seems deficient. It is true that Hume wants to distinguish 
between unusual events that can plausibly be viewed as having natural 
though unknown causes, i.e., marvels, and those that cannot, i.e., miracles. 
A criticism of his argument that appears to have concerned Hume is that 
it is unreasonable to insist that one's uniform personal experience should 
inevitably trump the testimony of others. The class of unusual events is 
not exhausted by miracles and we quite often accept the occurrence of 
unusual events outside our personal experience on the basis of testimo­
nial evidence. On pain of his argument proving too much Hume must 
argue not that it is in general impossible to establish the occurrence of 
unusual events on the basis of testimonial evidence, but that it is impos­
sible to establish the occurrence of a special type of unusual event, that 
is, miracles, on the basis of such evidence. His concern to deal with this 
criticism seems to be what motivated Hume, in the 1750 second edition, to 
include a discussion of Locke's well-known example of the Indian prince. 
He wants to claim that testimony can be sufficiently strong to establish the 
occurrence of marvels, but not of miracles. He attempts to do this on the 
ground that an event that is a marvel is unusual, but it does not contradict 
our firm and unalterable experience, that is, the laws of nature, whereas 
a miracle does contradict such experience, that is, it violates the laws of 
nature.24 It is an error, therefore, to suggest, as does J. C. A. Gaskin, that 
Hume can dispense with the distinction he attempts to draw between 
marvels and miracles.25
Even the most superficial reading of "Of Miracles" makes clear, how­
ever, that Hume was convinced that if certain events were to occur, they 
would be genuinely miraculous. Thus, he is quite prepared to say that "it 
is a miracle that a dead man should come to life."26 Wilson goes wrong in 
confusing two logically distinct questions: "How much testimonial evi­
dence is needed to establish the occurrence of an unusual event?" and "On 
what basis could it be established that an unusual event is a miracle?" Wil­
son takes Hume to be addressing the second question and interprets him 
as arguing that it is impossible to justify belief that an unusual event is a 
violation of the laws of nature. On Wilson's reading, Hume's argument is 
directed not at the difficulties of establishing unusual events on the basis
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of testimonial evidence but at the impossibility of ever rationally believing 
that an unusual event constitutes a violation of the laws of nature.27
Unfortunately, this reading makes nonsense not only of Hume's explicit 
willingness to identify certain conceivable events as miracles but also of his 
emphasis on the inability of testimonial evidence to establish such events. 
If Wilson's reading is accepted, it becomes a mystery why Hume would 
concern himself with issues of testimony, since the argument would estab­
lish that no matter what the unusual event, it is always irrational to view 
it as a violation of the laws of nature.28 Contra Wilson, Hume's aim is not 
to argue that the Resurrection of Jesus could never be accurately described 
as a miracle, but rather that testimonial evidence could never justify be­
lief that it did in fact occur. What Broad and Lewis recognize but Wilson 
fails to recognize-and what must be taken into account in any discussion 
of whether Hume's treatment of miracles is consistent with his sceptical 
treatment of induction and causality-is that Hume's argument is directed 
not at demonstrating that it is irrational to believe that unusual events of 
a certain conceivable type, that is to say miracles, violate the laws of na­
ture, but at showing there could never be sufficient testimonial evidence 
to justify belief in the occurrence of such events. Wilson does not succeed, 
therefore, in demonstrating that there is no inconsistency between Hume's 
treatment of induction earlier in the Enquiry and his claims regarding "un­
alterable laws of nature" in "Of Miracles."
Unfortunately, establishing an inconsistency between Hume's account 
of induction and his claims regarding unalterable laws of nature does little 
to advance a positive case for believing in miracles. As Lewis notes, fol­
lowing Hume,
we cannot say that uniformity is either probable or improbable; and 
equally we cannot say that miracles are either probable or improb­
able. We have impounded both uniformity and miracles in a sort 
of limbo where probability and improbability can never come. This 
result is equally disastrous for the scientist and the theologian; but 
along Hume's lines there is nothing whatever to be done about it.29
Lewis, however, is not content to offer a purely negative argument. He 
goes on to observe that we do in fact have a deep trust in the uniformity 
of nature, that "in advance of experience, in the teeth of many experi­
ences, we are already enlisted on the side of uniformity."30 It is this deep 
trust that regularities in nature can always be discovered, even in the face 
of apparent evidence to the contrary, that makes science possible. This 
raises the question of whether such trust should be regarded as justified 
or simply as an irrational quirk of human nature. Can trust in the unifor­
mity of nature, which seems to be a prerequisite of science, be philosophi­
cally vindicated?
Lewis writes that the answer to this question depends upon one's meta­
physic. If one is a naturalist there seems no reason to view such trust as in 
fact justified, but if one is a theist such trust seems eminently reasonable.
If all that exists is Nature, the great mindless interlocking event, if our 
own deepest convictions are merely the bye-products of an irrational
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process, then clearly there is not the slightest ground for supposing 
that our sense of fitness and our consequent faith in uniformity tell 
us anything about a reality external to ourselves. . . . If Naturalism 
is true we have no reason to trust our conviction that Nature is uni­
form. It can be trusted only if quite a different Metaphysic is true. If 
the deepest thing in reality, the Fact which is the source of all other 
facthood, is a thing in some degree like ourselves—if it is a Rational 
Spirit and we derive our rational spirituality from It—then indeed 
our conviction can be trusted. Our repugnance to disorder is derived 
from Nature's Creator and ours. The disorderly world which we can­
not endure to believe in is the disorderly world He would not have 
endured to create.31
Put a little differently, one of the central presuppositions of science seems 
to require a theistic metaphysics, if we are to place any trust in it. Once one 
adopts such a metaphysic, however, one must recognize the possibility of 
miracles. As Lewis puts it,
the philosophy which forbids you to make uniformity absolute is 
also the philosophy which offers you solid grounds for believing it 
to be almost absolute. The Being who threatens Nature's claim to om­
nipotence confirms her in her lawful occasions. . . . The alternative is 
really much worse. Try to make Nature absolute and you find that 
her uniformity is not even probable. By claiming too much, you get 
nothing. You get the deadlock, as in Hume. Theology offers you a 
working arrangement, which leaves the scientist free to continue his 
experiments and the Christian to continue his prayers.32
Lewis's second explicit criticism is that Hume's argument is viciously 
circular. Hume writes that "a firm and unalterable experience has estab­
lished the laws of nature"33 and since "a miracle is a violation of the laws 
of nature,"34 "there must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every 
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation."35 
Lewis responds that this argument begs the question, inasmuch as it as­
sumes what needs to be proved. He writes,
now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely 
"uniform experience" against miracles, if in other words they have 
never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know 
the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all 
the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be 
false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In 
fact, we are arguing in a circle.36
As in the case of his previous criticism of Hume's argument, this objection 
is not unique to Lewis, but was made by earlier writers. One of Hume's 
early critics, William Samuel Powell, asserts that Hume's claim that "na­
ture . . . is uniform and unvaried in her operations . . . either presumes the 
point in question, or touches not those events which are supposed to be 
out of the course of nature"37 and William Paley, writing in the nineteenth
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century, makes essentially this point against Hume, when he claims that 
for Hume "to state concerning the fact in question that no such thing was 
ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to assume the 
subject of the controversy.38
Lewis's charge that Hume's argument is viciously circular is frequently 
dismissed as based on a superficial reading of Part I of the "Essay." Joseph 
Houston suggests that Lewis takes Hume as claiming that a law of nature 
is based on uniform invariable experience that can allow of no exceptions 
if it is to be a law. Such an understanding of the laws of nature implies 
that miracles cannot occur, since they would be exceptions to what are, 
by definition, exceptionless regularities. Since Hume did not take himself 
simply to be exploring the implications of his definition of the laws of 
nature, Houston claims that Lewis must be mistaken in his understanding 
of Hume's argument.39
Robert Fogelin also accuses Lewis of misreading Hume. He asserts that 
Hume never argues that we know that all reports of miracles are false. He 
takes Hume simply to be claiming that we have a good deal of reliable 
testimonial evidence for the regularities of nature and that this body of 
evidence creates a strong presumption that testimonial evidence that these 
regularities have exceptions is false. He goes on to suggest that charges 
of circularity are probably due to the mistake of "attributing an a priori 
argument [against the possibility of a miracle occurring] to Hume where 
there is none.40
With regard to Houston's criticism of Lewis, while it seems true that 
Hume did not take himself simply to be exploring the implications of a 
definition of the laws of nature, what he in fact says about the laws of 
nature seems to imply that they must be defined as exceptionless regulari­
ties.41 We are told early in the argument that the laws of nature are based 
on "infallible experience" and a little later that they have been established 
by "firm and unalterable experience."42 Lest we misunderstand what is 
meant by the phrase "firm and unalterable experience" Hume tells us that 
"it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never 
been observed in any age or country" and that "there must, therefore, be 
a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event 
would not merit that appellation."43 Further, when Hume is faced with 
what would seem to be extremely strong evidence for the occurrence of an 
event plausibly viewed as miraculous, he is prepared to assert either that 
the event could not have occurred on the basis that miracles are absolutely 
impossible, or, if the event occurred, it must not be a miracle.44 It thus 
seems that, although Hume may have not noticed that he ruled out the 
occurrence of miracles by definition, there is good reason to think that this 
is in fact an implication of how he conceives the laws of nature.45
Strictly speaking, ruling out belief in miracles on the grounds that 
there cannot exist exceptions to what are, by definition, exceptionless 
regularities, does not commit one to a circular argument. Thus David 
Johnson suggests that Hume might attempt to escape the charge of cir­
cularity by making a conceptual argument from the very concept of a 
law of nature against the logical possibility of a miracle. The problem, 
as Johnson notes, is that, although there are elements of the "Essay" that 
point Hume's argument in this direction, such a move does not fit well
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with Hume's claim of weighing the evidence for miracles against the evi­
dence for the laws of nature. If the concept of miracle is a logical absur­
d ity -ak in  to the idea of a married bachelor-there is no need to raise the 
issue of conflicting bodies of evidence, since there can exist no evidence 
for what is logically impossible.
I think a good case can be made that there are conflicting lines of ar­
gument in the "Essay." Although Hume's official stance seems to be that 
miracles are logically possible but that there are insurmountable difficul­
ties in justifying belief in their actual occurrence, the claims he makes at 
several points in attempting to develop his argument imply the stronger 
conclusion that miracles are logically impossible. It is this conflict between 
his official stance and what he actually says in attempting to justify it that 
enables authors such as Johnson to suggest that Hume's goals are so con­
fused as to make it impossible to determine what his argument is.46 What 
is clear is that, unless he is simply willing to suggest that the concept of a 
miracle is logically incoherent, Hume's talk of "firm and unalterable expe­
rience" as ruling out the possibility of belief in miracles leaves him open 
to the charge of circularity.
Fogelin's criticism of Lewis hinges on his contention that Hume never 
intended to argue that it is in principle impossible to justify belief in a 
miracle on the basis of testimonial evidence. Although it has become in­
creasingly popular, this claim appears fundamentally mistaken. There are 
numerous lines of evidence, both direct and indirect, which demonstrate 
it is untenable.47 In the context of the present discussion two examples will 
suffice, although numerous others are available.
First, at the direct level, it cannot have escaped Hume's notice that to 
claim "the proof against a miracle . . . is as entire as any argument from experi­
ence can possibly be imagined" 48 (emphasis added) and that "such a proof 
[cannot] be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite 
proof, which is superior"49 does not allow the possibility of establishing a 
miracle on the basis of testimonial evidence, since there is no way, even in 
theory, that one could trump a proof against a miracle which "is as entire 
as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." The most a 
proponent of belief in miracle might hope for, even supposing she could 
produce an entirely convincing proof of a miracle, is a mutual destruction 
of arguments, i.e., a suspension of belief one way or another. Hume, of 
course, is not unaware that this conclusion must follow, but with typi­
cal irony and what Flew terms "mischievous modesty'50 he suggests that 
belief could be justified if, per the impossible, the evidence for a miracle 
could exceed the evidence against it.51
Second, at the indirect level, it is significant that all the responses made 
to the "Essay" during Hume's lifetime took him to be arguing the impossi­
bility of testimony justifying belief in miracles, but Hume never suggested 
that these critics misunderstood the intent of the "Essay." Philip Skelton's 
Opiomaches or Deism Revealed52 contains the first published reply to the 
"Essay" and takes it as attempting to demonstrate that belief in miracles 
can never be rational, yet Hume as the publisher's reader recommended 
publication of Skelton's manuscript.53 Similarly, Campbell in his Disserta­
tion on Miracles, takes Hume to be arguing for an in principle rejection of 
establishing belief in miracles on the basis of testimony. Hume accepted an
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invitation to respond to Campbell, but at no point in criticizing Campbell 
does he claim that Campbell has misunderstood what the argument of the 
"Essay" is intended to establish. Hume's silence is inexplicable if he felt 
that his respondents fundamentally missed the point of the "Essay," but 
makes good sense if he intended to assert that no amount of testimonial 
evidence could be sufficient to justify accepting a miracle report.54
That Hume does in fact intend his argument to be taken as an a priori 
demonstration that belief in a miracle can never, even in principle, be jus­
tified on the basis of testimony seems clear. Fogelin is wrong, therefore, 
to suggest that Lewis's objection that Hume's argument is circular can 
be simply dismissed on the basis that Lewis does not understand what 
Hume is trying to show. There are conflicting elements of argument in 
the "Essay," but at least some of these strongly suggest that the charge of 
circularity is well grounded.55
We have looked at Lewis's explicit criticisms of Hume's argument, 
which occur in Chapter XIII, "On Probability." I think, however, that a 
more important criticism is implicit in Chapter VIII, "Miracle and the 
Laws of Nature."
Hume's argument in Part I of the "Essay" can be summarized as follows:
The testimonial evidence in favour of a miracle inevitably conflicts 
with the evidence in favour of the laws of nature.
The testimonial evidence in favour of a miracle cannot exceed, even 
in principle, the evidence in favour of the laws of nature.
Therefore, belief in the occurrence of a miracle can never be justified 
on the grounds of testimonial evidence.
Critics of the argument have almost exclusively focussed on the sec­
ond premise. Accepting Hume's claim that a miracle must be conceived 
as violating the laws of nature and thus that any evidence for a miracle 
must conflict with the evidence for the laws of nature, they have left the 
first premise unexamined. This is unfortunate, since accepting the first 
premise means that even if, contra Hume, there exists in some cases suf­
ficient evidence to justify belief in a miracle, this evidence must be viewed 
as necessarily conflicting with another body of evidence we are strongly 
inclined to accept, namely the evidence which justifies belief in the laws of 
nature. Thus Hume insists that
the very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree 
of assurance in the testimony of witnesses gives us also, in this case 
[reports of miracles], another degree of assurance against the fact 
which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there 
necessarily arises a counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief 
and authority.56
The view that a necessary condition of an event being a miracle is that 
it violates the laws of nature, arises out of the assumption that divine
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interventions in nature would necessarily involve violating the laws of na­
ture. One of Lewis's greatest insights is that this assumption is mistaken. 
That it is mistaken can be seen if one reflects on the fact that laws of nature 
do not, by themselves, allow the prediction or explanation of any event. 
Scientific explanations must make reference not only to laws of nature, but 
to material conditions to which the laws apply. Thus, although we often 
speak as though the laws of nature are, in themselves, sufficient to explain 
the occurrence of an event, this is not really so. Any explanation involving 
the laws of nature must make reference not only to those laws, but also to 
the actual "stuff" of nature whose behaviour is described by the laws of 
nature. As Lewis notes,
we are in the habit of talking as if they [the laws of nature] caused 
events to happen; but they have never caused any event at all. The 
laws of motion do not set billiard balls moving: they analyse the mo­
tion after something else (say, a man with a cue, or a lurch of the liner, 
or, perhaps, supernatural power) has provided it. They produce no 
events: they state the pattern to which every event—if only it can be 
induced to happen—must conform, just as the rules of arithmetic state 
the pattern to which all transactions with money must conform—if 
only you can get hold of any money. Thus in one sense the laws of 
Nature cover the whole field of space and time; in another, what they 
leave out is precisely the whole real universe—the incessant torrent 
of actual events which makes up true history. That must come from 
somewhere else. To think the laws can produce it is like thinking that 
you can create real money by simply doing sums. For every law, in 
the last resort, says "If you have A, then you will get B." But first catch 
your A: the laws won't do it for you.57
If we keep in mind this basic distinction between the laws of nature and 
the "stuff," call it mass/energy, whose behaviour they describe, it can be 
seen that, although a miracle is an event which would never have oc­
curred without the overriding of nature, this in no way entails the claim 
that a miracle involves a violation of the laws of nature. If a transcen­
dent agent creates or annihilates a unit of mass/energy, or if he simply 
causes some of the stuff to occupy a different position than it did formerly, 
then he changes the material conditions to which the laws of nature ap­
ply. He thereby produces an event that nature on its own would not have 
produced, but He breaks no laws of nature. To use Lewis's example, one 
would not violate or suspend the laws of motion if one were to toss an 
extra billiard ball into a group of billiard balls in motion on a billiard table, 
yet one would override the outcome of what would otherwise be expected 
to happen on the table. Similarly,
if God creates a miraculous spermatozoon in the body of a virgin, it 
does not proceed to break any laws. The laws at once take it over. . . . 
Pregnancy follows, according to all the normal laws, and nine months 
later a child is born. . . . If events ever come from beyond Nature alto­
gether she will . . . [not be] incommoded by them__ The moment they
enter her realm they obey all her laws. Miraculous wine will intoxicate,
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miraculous conception will lead to pregnancy, inspired books will suf­
fer all the ordinary processes of textual corruption, miraculous bread 
will be digested. The divine art of miracle is not an art of suspending 
the pattern to which events conform but of feeding new events into 
that pattern. It does not violate the law's proviso, "If A, then B": it says, 
"But this time instead of A, A2'" and Nature, speaking through all her 
laws, replies, "Then B2'" and naturalises the immigrant, as she well 
knows how.58
The importance of Lewis's insight is that if miracles can occur without 
violating the laws of nature then the testimonial evidence in favour of 
miracles need not be conceived as conflicting with the evidence which 
grounds belief in the laws of nature. This means that Hume's argument in 
Part I of the "Essay," depending as it does upon the assumption that these 
two bodies of evidence must conflict, cannot even get started.
An important objection which might be raised, but which Lewis fails to 
discuss is that at least one law of nature must be broken on this account 
of miracle, since the creation, annihilation or moving of material entities 
by a non-physical agent would involve the creation or destruction of en­
ergy and thus would violate the First Law of Thermodynamics, i.e., the 
Principle of the Conservation of Energy. It seems, however, that Lewis's 
account can be defended against this objection.
This objection fails to take into consideration a very important distinc­
tion between two forms of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. 
The Principle is commonly stated as "Energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed" or as "In an isolated system the total amount of energy remains 
constant'; the assumption being that these two statements are logically 
equivalent. This, though, is false. We can deduce from the proposition 
"Energy can neither be created nor destroyed" the proposition "In an iso­
lated system the total amount of energy remains constant," but we cannot 
deduce from the proposition "In an isolated system the total amount of 
energy remains constant" deduce the proposition "Energy can neither be 
created nor destroyed." The proposition "Energy can neither be created 
nor destroyed" is considerably stronger, i.e., carries a greater ontological 
commitment, than the proposition "In an isolated system the total amount 
of energy remains constant.'
The significance of this distinction is considerable. First, it bears em­
phasis that the strong form of the Principle, i.e., the claim that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed, not only rules out miracles but theism 
in general, since it rules out the possibility of creation ex nihilo. Second, 
although the believer in miracles must reject the strong form of the Prin­
ciple, she can accept what I have called the weak form of the Principle, i.e., 
the claim that energy is conserved in a causally isolated system. She is in a 
position to accept all the experimental evidence taken to support belief in 
the Principle, since that evidence only demonstrates there is good reason 
to believe that energy is conserved in a causally isolated system. She rejects 
not the well-evidenced claim that in a causally isolated system energy is 
conserved, but the much more questionable claim that nature is an isolated 
system, in the sense that it is not open to the causal influence of God. In 
short, she is in a position to affirm the Principle of the Conservation of
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Energy when it is formulated as a scientific law and not as an a priori meta­
physical principle which excludes the possibility of theism being true.
It is clear, therefore, that conceiving of a miracle as involving the cre­
ation or annihilation of mass/energy does not imply that the Principle of 
the Conservation of Energy is violated, so long as there is good reason to 
adopt the weak rather than the strong form of the Principle. Accepting the 
occurrence of a miracle involving the creation or annihilation of energy 
does not commit one to denying the vast body of experimental evidence 
supporting belief that energy is conserved in an isolated system. Rather, 
accepting the occurrence of such a miracle commits one to arguing that 
the inference employed in moving from the claim that energy is conserved 
in an isolated system to the claim that energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed is ill-founded.59
That the inference is ill-founded and tends to be question-begging seems 
clear. The experimental evidence taken to support belief in the Principle 
establishes that we have good reason to believe that energy is conserved 
in an isolated system, but is neutral as regards the further question of 
whether or not there exists something capable of creating or destroying 
energy. All that any experiment or series of experiments can show is that 
energy was conserved in an isolated system on a particular occasion or 
series of occasions. If the move from the weak form of the Principle is to 
be justified, it must be on the basis that the strong form of the Principle 
provides an explanation of why the weak form holds true and that there 
exists no evidence that energy is ever created or destroyed. This move is 
problematic on several counts.
First, the theist is able to provide an alternative explanation of why the 
weak form of the Principle would hold true. Conceiving of the universe 
as a contingent reality in which physical causes operate, equally explains 
why the weak form holds true. Insisting that energy can neither be created 
nor destroyed seems merely to attribute necessary existence to energy 
rather than to God and makes clear the fact that the strong form functions 
not simply as a statement of observed regularity in nature, but as a defin­
ing-postulate of physicalism.
Second, the strong form seems at odds with the Big-Bang theory of 
the origin of the universe. This theory is commonly accepted and com­
monly interpreted as implying an absolute beginning to the energy that 
composes the universe. It is possible to accept both the weak form of the 
Principle and the Big-Bang theory, but it is hard to see how acceptance of 
the Big-Bang theory is consistent with affirming the truth of the strong 
form of the Principle.
Third, leaving aside the fact that commonly accepted scientific theory 
may imply the falsity of the strong form of the Principle, it is clear that the 
physicalist is in no position to object to belief in miracles on the basis of 
the strong form of the Principle. The occurrence of miracles would imply 
the creation or annihilation of energy, but would not imply that energy is 
not conserved in an isolated system. The theist denies not that energy is 
conserved in an isolated system, but rather that the physical universe is 
an isolated system in the sense that it is never causally affected by tran­
scendent agents. Given a positive body of evidence for miracles, it will 
not do to try and frame a Humean type balance-of-probabilities argument
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designed to show there is a conflict between the experimental evidence 
taken to support belief in the Principle of the Conservation of Energy and 
the evidence in favour of miracles. The occurrence of miracles conceived 
as acts of creation or annihilation of energy conflicts not with any positive 
evidence supporting belief in the Principle, but rather with a metaphysi­
cal commitment to naturalism. Faced with reports of events which would 
constitute positive evidence that energy can be created or destroyed, it 
begs the question to dismiss such events, or to argue that they are an­
tecedently improbable, on the ground that they imply the falsity of the 
strong form of the Principle.60 It seems, therefore, that Lewis is correct in 
his assertion that miracles should not be defined as implying violation of 
the laws of nature.
I conclude that Lewis's views on miracle are worthy of more attention 
and respect by professional philosophers than they typically receive. Es­
pecially important is his insight that miracles need not be defined as viola­
tions of the laws of nature and the implications this insight has for Hume's 
famous argument in Part I of the "Essay on Miracles."61
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